Committing of sexual violence by the aggressor country's servicemen as a problem of human rights violations during the occupation (on the example of the Russian-Ukrainian war, 2022)

Kherson Faculty, Department of Special Physical and Fire Training, Odessa State University of Internal Affairs, st. Fonvizina, 1, Kherson, 73034, Ukraine

International Science Journal of Jurisprudence & Philosophy

The paper considers the current problem of committing crimes against civilians by servicemen of the Russian army in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine during the 2022 war. Based on the above cases of torture, rape, murder and other forms of violence, as well as the generalization of statistical data on the number of deaths in the occupied territories in general, the violation by the aggressor country of the requirements of the Convention on the protection of civilian people in war time and human rights in general according to current legislation are shown. The analysis of current research on various aspects of sexual violence was performed: 1) the concept and methodological (philosophical) foundations of adequate understanding of sexual freedom / critical attitude to sexual violence; 2) prevention of the cult of violence and cruelty in society; 3) the impact of violence, including sexual violence, on the physical and mental health of the victim; 4) legal aspects of combating crimes against sexual freedom and sexual violence in general. On the basis of generalizations of modern approaches of scientists concerning various directions of the decision of the raised problem novelty of the offered work is proved. To compare with modern RF war crimes methods of abuse of detainees in PCIA units which were committed in the last century are presented. The main methods of torture include such as 1) «testing» by smoldering cigarettes; 2) beating a person without leaving marks on the body; 3) torture of people with a loud sound; 4) prolonged torture by thirst; 5) rape (standard test for women). The legal nature of rape as a criminal offense against sexual freedom on the basis of current domestic law is described (Article 152 of the Criminal Code). Such categories (legal concepts) as sexual freedom, sexual intercourse, physical violence during rape, helplessness of the victim, qualifying signs of rape, repeated rape, continued rape, rape committed by a group of persons are revealed. Potential causes of criminal behaviour of Russian servicemen during the war in Ukraine, which motivated aggression against civilians, are considered. The main factors of this national ideology include the following: 1) the ideas of Orthodox fascism, Eurasianism, the modern concept of «Russian world»; «Novorossiya» project; 2) the phenomenon of «hazing» in the Soviet / Russian army among the rank and file, bullying of officers against subordinates in units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; 3) torture in places of imprisonment; 4) mass criminal subculture («convict way of life is one» movement); 5) reflection of criminal values in modern Russian culture and art («Russian chanson», cinema, etc.); 6) propaganda of the mythical successes of the «great state», the strength of the Chechen warrior, the invincibility of Russia, etc. The methodological principles of the long-term ideology and propaganda of the occupying country, which are the main manifestations of barbarism and violence by the servicemen of the occupying country during the war in Ukraine, are revealed. It is concluded that the crimes of sexual violence committed by the Russian military require immediate documentation by law enforcement agencies, detailed investigation and prompt communication of this information to the UNO and all countries of the civilized world, as well as further prosecution of perpetrators.

Torture
Sexual violence
Human rights
Criminology
Ukrainian
Convention
Psychology
Law
Cruelty
Political science
Sociology
Social psychology


Fascist Modernism in Italy Arts and Regimes

University of Alaska Fairbanks [zjones@alaska.edu]

American Association of Teachers of Italian

Modernism (music)
The arts
Art
Aesthetics
Visual arts
Art history


Review: <i>Italian Neorealism: A Cultural History</i>, by Charles L. Leavitt IV

BOOK DATA: Charles L. Leavitt IV, Italian Neorealism: A Cultural History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020. $85.00 cloth. xi + 313 pages

Icon
Neorealism (international relations)
Art history
Movie theater
Cultural history
Art
Media studies
History
Humanities
Sociology
International relations
Political science
Politics
Computer science
Law
Economic history


Animals and Animality in Primo Levi's Work

Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan

Work (physics)
Art
Psychoanalysis
Art history
Philosophy
Psychology
Engineering


Marietta Sadova: Fascist Identities and Political Compromise in Communist Romania

Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Historia

Communism
Politics
Ideology
Sociology
Historiography
Law
Political science


Disrupted and Unsettled: An Introduction to Monuments, Memorials, and Italian Migrations

Romance
Immigration
History
Dove
Art
Humanities
Art history
Literature
Law
Archaeology
Political science


What Is Happening to Religious Studies? Six Narratives

University of Bergen  Norway
University of Bergen, Norway

The starting point of this essay is the assumption that religious studies (or the study of religion\s, as I prefer to call it) are topically defined, that is, that our work somehow relates to religion or religions, to "religion" or "religious" features; religion establishes our "disciplinary horizon" (Smith 2004, 194). As scholars of religion/"religion," we are endlessly fascinated by it. There may be good theoretical and pragmatic reasons to abandon this key notion and opt for more promising ones—maybe spirituality (Hanegraaff 2020) or worldview (Taves 2020)—but until we have agreed on such proposals, our fate is tied to that of religion, or "religion." So, what is the fate of religion, or rather, how do we tell it? A while ago, Jim Spickard argued that "sociologists of religion are no longer arguing over a single account of religion's place in the contemporary world" (Spickard 2006, 14). Instead, he held that we can best "comprehend our current disciplinary conflict as a clash between six distinct stories about 'What is happening to religion?' today and in the years to come" (Spickard 2006, 14). In this essay, in a recursive move, I will reflect on "What is happening to religious studies" by using Spickard's six narratives as signposts.1 Of course, as critical readers will not fail to observe, I will need to allow myself a good dose of hermeneutic liberty to make the exercise of analogous thinking work. Space does not allow me to unpack any of these six narratives or tropes, so I will need to allude to potential stories that could be told and leave the rest to the readers' imaginations. I hope the reader will forgive me for this conceit and for referring to some of my own earlier work as examples of some of the trends I mention in this essay. This master trope can be turned into several stories. The obvious one is the story of decline; just as fewer people attend services in Western countries, we now have fewer students than before. Departments have been closed, just as many convents and churches have. And maybe there is not just correlation but causality at work here. Secularization has been reinforced by a decrease in religious socialization (Stolz 2020); similarly, there is a lower degree of religious literacy among the students we get in Western Europe—few have grown up with Biblical stories, even though many have encountered religious motives through popular culture—and fewer of our students choose religious studies to cope with their religious biographies. In other words: as fewer people find religion important in their own lives and have experience with practiced religion or homes imbued by faith or apostasy, fewer find religion a salient option to study. If this biographical trigger disappears, so does the emotional appeal of religious studies, and as I see it, we do not offer intellectual resources that are ahead of or superior to other disciplines—in fact, most of our methods and theorizing derives from other disciplines such as anthropology and sociology—nor do religious studies degrees offer promising career or job opportunities. In this story, secularization causally affects religious studies. Yet, secularization also causally affects religious studies because fewer scholars have a religious biography; as there are fewer liberal Christians out there, there are also fewer here (i.e., in our departments). The present cohort of scholars in the community is no longer dominated by Christians, and the study of religion\s, at least in Europe, has become a self-avowedly secular affair,2 where religion is taboo as a subjective factor and "theology" a dirty word, or where religion has been given up in favor of studying "religion," to see what groups and institutions do with this word or category (e.g., Taira 2022).3 Traditionally, historicization has been an effective strategy of disenchantment or laicization, and under the disguise of "history of religions," we have been part of this story (see Stausberg 2023 for the case of Geo Widengren). Just as many churches live on as cultural heritage, we describe religions similarly by emphasizing cultural context and significance while at the same time being skeptical toward factors like religious experiences as driving forces. A significant strand of European scholarship on religion looks at representations of religion, for example, in tourism (Stausberg 2011), in the media, in popular culture, in fiction; in all of these segments of culture, professional scholars can find an abundance of religion, even if this does not mean that they observe religious communication, that the writers and their readers are highly religious. Also, the recent rise of the study of the nonreligious makes sense in this narrative of secularization (see the journal Secularism & Nonreligion [2012ff]). Even though the term "fundamentalism" has a certain outdated flavor to it since Evangelicalism has surpassed Fundamentalism as the dominant successful rival to Liberalism in recent decades, the features Spickard associates with this label have not disappeared; among other things, Spickard mentions literalism, conservativism, sectarianism in the sense of world rejection and seeing their respective religion as "the sole repository of truth" (18), reverence for rules, and a grounding for identity "for those who distrust a world gone mad" (18). Spickard adds the caveat that the fundamentalist narrative "is a common one among journalists and political scientists" but "not so common among sociologists and scholars of religion" (17). And, of course, with regard to this narrative, my strategy of redescription can look implausible, for would I really go so far and claim to detect "fundamentalist" tendency in religious studies? But wait a minute. Are there no positions in religious studies, for instance in Germany, where candidates' religious or confessional outlook overrules their academic competence? And is the experience of hitting some kind of doctrinal wall really that uncommon in academia? What are the limits of the sayable? Are there no tendencies in academia, including religious studies, to consider one's own version of it as "the sole repository" of true scholarship? Are we senior scholars not sometimes having the sensation of "a world gone mad"? The diagnosis of this "madness" can, of course, vary a good deal, with potential culprits ranging, mostly for good reasons, from neoliberalism, new management, the competition state, cancel culture, identity politics, truth decay, new fascisms, and political authoritarianism. Liberal intellectuals find themselves in opposition to these developments, some even doing this is in a mode of activism (Van der Haven 2023) or by taking on a habitus of silent resistance.4 A culture of fear may have spread to such an extent that there is "an army of scholars who wisely don't publicly resist postmodernism, feminism, poststructuralism, etc., but do quietist resistance by doing for instance only philology, dry detailed historical work, etc., and avoiding any 'political' subjects" (Van der Haven 2023). We may also ask: Is there no "reverence" for canonical figures in religious studies, where a citation of some phrase, or the dropping of some name (or just invoking initials), has the intended effect of settling the matter, of closing the case, instead of constantly self-critically questioning our basic assumptions? Maybe the Liberalism fought by Fundamentalism, or the Humanistic Secularism attacked by Evangelicalism can, in scholarship, loosely be compared with the phantom image of postmodernism with its chaotic (almost) anything goes (within certain limits) that needs to be disciplined by evoking fundamental rules of real science or by invoking a set of "theses"? And just as Fundamentalism wishes to Make Religion Great Again, so certain branches of scholarship wish to Make Religious Studies Science Again against the perceived threat of its navel-gazing postmodern dilution and playfulness. Others criticize "woke" versions of religious studies that seek to overcome colonialism, structural discrimination, and injustice, starting with confessions of epistemic sins, as "evangelical, dogmatic, or even fundamentalist" and religion-like programs (Prohl 2022, 125). Does the power invoked by postmodernists and critical theorists disempower others? This section of Spickard's essay has a clearly American perspective; he believes that this "tale … is as plausible on the American scene as the tale of religious decline is on the European one" (19). Several European sociologists and most European scholars of religion would instead go for the tale of the great religious transformation. While Spickard's narrative focuses on churches, European scholars tend to conceptualize religion more broadly. Spickard's reorganization refers to "church shopping" and the rise of "independent churches"; he points to immigrant congregations and "religious localism," that is, religion "in its local manifestation." In my attempt to use this trope for my playful exercise, I can point to a tendency among many religious studies programs in Europe to draw on their local religious environments for teaching and research. Immigration has, of course, been a key factor in changing religious landscapes in Europe, especially in urban contexts.5 Second- or third-generation migrants have become an important part of the student population in religious studies departments. Another dimension is migrant sponsorship of the study of their respective religious tradition through donations and endowments. So far, this development has been less visible in continental Europe compared with the UK and North America. In the field of Zoroastrian studies, where some of my scholarly activities are located, this has been a game changer since partly adherent-endowed chairs and institutes have been established in England (SOAS), Canada (University of Toronto), and the United States (University of California, Irvine). As governments tend to reduce their investment in the study of ancient and foreign languages or adopt policies that come at the expense of the humanities (see Hammer 2020 for the case of Denmark), this partnership with religious groups and people may become ever the more important. If we extend Spickard's focus on the reorganization of churches to transformations of or within the religious field in a broader sense, then this would cover much of the ground that religious studies has been gaining over the past decades, which has gone past the canon of the big religions, dismissed the idea of "world religions," paid attention to religious discourses and discourses on religion beyond the sphere of religions, addressed the history and work of the category of "religion," and explored alternative religiosities, or alternatives to religion and "religion." In Europe, for example, Western Esotericism has become a big thing—and once again, private sponsorship has been instrumental to push this field off the ground, with the Center for the History of Hermetic Philosophy and Related Currents (HHP) located at the University of Amsterdam (Stausberg 2013). While committed Christians or Jews have become rare, or invisible, in the study of religion\s, at least in Europe, my impression is that a fair amount of students of Western Esotericism have more than purely academic interests in this subject matter; practicing pagans, witches, and magicians have also become more visible, and this field thrives in the interplay between research and practice. Religious diversity has grown, not just between churches but within them. Where once most individuals accepted what their leaders told them, today they demand the right to decide for themselves … Not only do individuals today not generally believe everything that their church leaders tell them they should, but members of many churches display a diversity of religious beliefs and practices that formerly would have been defined as heresies. (21) Another perspective down from our pulpits is the increased diversity within our classrooms. Where we in Norway can still assume a fairly coherent template for a shared understanding of "religion," partly because our students had the benefit of compulsory education on religion at private and public schools, such degrees of background coherence can no longer be taken for granted in many other countries. However, can we really be sure that we avoid groupthink? To some extent, groupthink can be a side effect of the formation of disciplines that streamline academic discourse. Is there evidence for a greater diversity of opinions and preferences within the tribe? I think, to some extent, there is (but see also below #6). As I see it, there is general agreement that there is no longer a master narrative that unites us, whether it is history or phenomenology. Instead, what we find is a proliferation of different approaches or "turns" (Bachmann-Medick 2016), groundbreaking methodological and theoretical reorientations such as the interpretative, performative, reflexive, postcolonial, translational, spatial, iconic, discursive, semiotic, semantic, material, aesthetic, cognitive, evolutionary, ecological, critical, digital, or others, which all have enrichened our understandings of religion. Facilitated by smooth new technologies, there also occurs a proliferation of new journals, often on the initiative of individual scholars. So, individualization can be tied to complaints about fragmentation and overspecialization—as if these were not rather common processes of academic developments. Spickard, however, rightly raises the question whether the individualization narrative maybe paints a distorted picture of the past (22). We may likewise ask whether our writing of disciplinary history tends to conceal diversity and eclecticism, for example, by privileging certain individuals, schools, and institutions considered as more important or original than their more mediocre coevals, by overlooking publications that at some points were no longer cited (even though they may have astonishing insights; Gilhus 2023) and periodicals that stopped being produced. Writing history can be a canonization of the past. From his American vantage point, Spickard assigns great importance to the marketplace, rational choice, or supply-side theory. While Spickard finds it "extremely popular among young sociologists," he also warns that "most of its advocates have little cross-cultural experience" (23). My impression is that this narrative has been much less popular among European sociologists, and it has come under heavy attack on this side of the ocean (e.g., Bruce 1999; Gauthier 2020; see also Gauthier and Spickard 2022). Indeed, this narrative aptly illustrates the cultural divide between the United States and Europe, and Rodney Stark's theorizing, as I read him, has to no small measure been informed by American triumphalist disgust for European models of state church relationships, aka "monopolies." Can this narrative be applied to reflecting on the current and future situation of religious studies, apart from serving as a powerful reminder of the importance of cultural context and reminding of the global impact of neoliberalism on universities worldwide? Is a religious studies degree a good "investment" for students, and are religious studies departments good ways to spend "tax money"? Has the university run like a business made us more "industrious" or "productive" and our teaching more "efficient"? Have the incentives to reach for more low-hanging fruits worked? As embarrassing as it is, there might even be reasons to answer such questions in the affirmative (but the opposite may also be true). Let us take a different perspective. If what Stark says about successful "religious firms" is true, could such a marketplace model potentially endorse the importance of old-fashioned and strict scholarship (high-cost, strong boundaries, similar to allegedly successful churches). Are interpretations of religion that are presented with more self-confidence—THIS is the way SCIENCE of religion REALLY is—and that more self-assertedly distinguish their claims from "nonsense," "pseudo-scholarship" or "theology" more successful than softer, more reluctant, hesitant, open, and reflexive accounts? There is also another way of looking at it: We should become better entrepreneurs, we should make religion ("religion") more interesting, we should captivate our audiences, we should tell better stories (see also Hanegraaff 2020). As Spickard summarizes, this narrative, contrary to narrative #1 (above), is built on the premise that the "demand" for "religious goods" "is nearly always constant" (22). So, there should be a constant demand for knowledge about religions. We tend to think that religion ("religion") is of interest per se, but probably we must make it more interesting than it really is. (Isn't religion, or for that matter "religion," often a tedious matter?) It is not by accident that some independent scholars, who live off the sale of their books, the ticket sales for their talks, or advertisements for their podcasts, do a better job in this business of how TO MAKE RELIGION INTERESTING AGAIN. A well-known British example is Karen Armstrong (b. 1944). Maybe, then, Stark has been right nevertheless; working at public universities, instead of devising attention-catching products that will increase our market share, we are like the lazy priests of monopolist churches who have no motivations to proselytize, happy to engage in discussing petty issues with like-minded bureaucrats and put our congregations of students to sleep. Writing back in 2006, Spickard found that narrative "not so well-established" (24). It certainly now is. Spickard gives Peter Beyer's powerful rendition of it. It seems self-evident that the emergence of a global sphere of religion has been a driving force of religious studies as a global discipline and that the claim of universal relevance of religion has been endorsed by self-presentations of the discipline (Melvær and Stausberg 2013); it is no accident that the volume edited by Gregory Alles, which portrays the global contours of the discipline came out some years after Spickard's essay (Alles 2008). Having three subsequent world congresses of the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) outside of Europe and North America (Mexico City 1995; Durban 2000; Tokyo 2005) also illustrated the desire to globalize the discipline. In some countries, like Brazil, religious studies has expanded considerably, but compared with other disciplines—including the sociology of religion and other related disciplines (see Spickard 2017; Day et al. 2022)—non-Western scholarship has not received much attention in the canonical literature such as textbooks and handbooks; our curriculum has hardly begun to become de-colonized and inclusive, and maybe certain versions of postcolonialism have "hampered the globalization of the field, by its ignoring of the agency and intellectual cultures of the colonized" (Van der Haven 2023). Even though diversity has increased in some ways (see above, #5), it is considered insufficient in terms of epistemology by some (Day 2020). Transregional studies, where religion is taught from non-Western perspectives, such as from Africa, have been called for (Meyer 2020). Other models of the university—the Pluriversity—and other models of research, such as Participatory work, have been put on the table (van Klinken 2020). Globalization in this sense does then not mean the global (neo-colonial) export of established modes of Western scholarship but new forms of entanglements. So far, I am embarrassed to admit that little of this emerging entangled work has begun to cross my perception threshold. To make my own position explicit, my hermeneutical filter continues to block texts that transcend the historicist, humanist, and culturalist framework of our discipline; in the discursive context of the study of religion\s, I still refuse to accept arguments (whatever their origin), that are grounded in or speak in the name of timeless, superhuman and paracultural truth claims, whether they refer to the authority of "nature" or nonhuman agents or entities. Writes Spickard: "Were we to ask Beyer 'What is happening to religion?' I think he would say, 'It is becoming very messy.' And I would have to agree." (25) And I would have to as religious studies. And because are we can tell different stories that all have some degree of I could have stories, of course, but the has not been to present an picture but to offer a of beyond my own preferences while at the same time that my own work can be in several of such Let me this with a of I believe in and with and and and as If we the study of to under the of and our best is to these in our students and career scholars. to my and and der Haven for on a of this essay.

Happening
Narrative
Discipline
Sociology
Spirituality
Epistemology
Aesthetics
Environmental ethics
History
Social science
Philosophy
Literature
Art


Italian Orientalism: Nationhood, Cosmopolitanism and the Cultural Politics of Identity by Fabrizio De Donno

Orientalism
Cosmopolitanism
Politics
Identity (music)
History
Literature
Aesthetics
Art
Political science
Law


Authoritarian Regimes in the Long Twentieth Century: Preconditions, Structures, Continuities: Contributions to European Historical Dictatorship and Transformation Research ed. by Florian Kührer-Wielach and Oliver Rathkolb (review)

Dictatorship
Authoritarianism
Sociology
German
Political science
History
Political economy
Economic history
Democracy
Law
Politics
Archaeology


eScholarship Publishing, University of California

This essay looks at the four-year period Indro Montanelli spent as a journalist, writer, and Fascist government representative in Estonia, Poland, and Finland between 1937 and 1941: four years during which the map of Europe was permanently redrawn. Much of the research is new. It complements the two-volume life of Montanelli by Sandro Gerbi and Raffaele Liucci (issued as a single volume in 2014 as Indro Montanelli: una biografia (1909–2001 ), and Marcello Staglieno’s earlier biography, Montanelli : novant’anni controcorrente, from 2001. Montanelli was at times undoubtably a great journalist. The reports he filed from Helsinki on Finland’s 1939–40 Winter War with Russia acquire a bitter topicality today in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine (for the first time since 1945 a state-on-state war has come to Europe.) In Montanelli’s Helsinki dispatches it seems that history—the great unforeseen—was repeating itself already from Tsarist times. Montanelli was banished to Estonia by the Fascist regime in 1937 as “punishment” for the insufficiently pro-Franco reportage he produced in Civil War Spain. In his Baltic exile he found himself at the crossroads of future East-West antagonisms, for if there is a West Berlin equivalent in today’s so-called “Second Cold War,” it is Estonia, which is vulnerable to Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank. In his Estonian journalism, Montanelli intuited that Stalin did not think the Soviet Union could survive as an East Slavic superstate and bulwark against German territorial aggression without eastern Poland and the Baltic states subordinate to the USSR. Putin’s own pseudo-Tsarist vision of a Greater Russia one and indivisible—his Russky Mir, “Russian World”—has its roots in the Hitler-Stalin conflict to which Montanelli bore witness. The essay argues that Montanelli was enamored of certain aspects of Italian Fascism to the end of his days, and that his divorce from Mussolini’s regime after 1937 was not as clean as he cared to make out in later years. Montanelli was often attracted to right-wing demagogues and “strong men” of one stripe or another, among them the Norwegian collaborator Vidkun Quisling and Marshal Mannerheim of Finland (both of whom Montanelli was pleased to meet). New light is shed in the essay on Montanelli’s relationship to Estonia’s fiercely anti-Soviet Baltic German community (of which Hitler’s chief race ideologist Alfred Rosenberg claimed to be a part). The historical archives of La Stampa and the Corriere della Sera— the newspapers for which Montanelli wrote in his Baltic period—have supplied new information on what Estonia and the Estonian people meant to Montanelli. The bibliography on Montanelli is vast. It includes book-length interviews conducted by Italian journalists with Montanelli himself, as well as Montanelli’s own journalistic memoirs (notably I cento giorni della Finlandia [One Hundred Days of Finland] , published in 1940), together with his semi-fictional autobiographies (what we might now call “autofiction”), such as Qui non riposano (Here They Do Not Rest) from 1945. Much of this bibliography has been consulted for the essay. The Italian newspaper archives, however, provided me with the most compelling new information. From them I was able to recreate the details of Montanelli’s movements in the autumn of 1941 in Nazi-conquered Tallinn (which no biography has described). The Estonian state archives yielded previously unseen information on the White Russian source Montanelli used in order to write his extraordinary La Stampa “scoop” on Stalin’s purge of the Red Army in 1937. His name was Boris Engelhardt and, like Montanelli, he was far from straightforward.


David Jones on Religion, Politics, and Culture: Unpublished Prose ed. by Thomas Berenato, Anne Price-Owen, and Kathleen Henderson Staudt

Barbarian
Politics
Heaven
History
Celtic languages
Classics
Polity
Religious studies
Theology
Literature
Philosophy
Art
Law
Ancient history


Mobilizing Cultural Identities in the First World War: History, Representations and Memory ed. by Federica G. Pedriali and Cristina Savettieri

Psychology
Humanities
History
Psychoanalysis
Sociology
Gender studies
Art


Ireland, Revolution, and the English Modernist Imagination by Eve Patten (review)

Imagination
History
Art
Sociology
Psychology
Cognitive psychology


A History of Eastern Europe 1918 to the Present: Modernisation, Ideology and Nationality by Ian D. Armour

Modernization theory
Context (archaeology)
Ideology
Geography
Nationality
Peninsula
Archaeology
History
Ancient history
Political science
Law
Politics


Mussolini’s Theatre: Fascist Experiments in Art and Politics by Patricia Gaborik (review)

Politics
Art
Art history
Performance art
History
Visual arts
Political science
Law


Modernism (music)
Newspaper
Solidarity
Globalization
Art history
History
Political science
Art
Media studies
Classics
Literature
Sociology
Politics
Law


Charlotte Salomon and the Theatre of Memory by Griselda Pollock

Pollock
Narrative
Watson
Art
Modernism (music)
Art history
Musical
Performance art
Literature
History


Modernity
Enlightenment
Orient
Philosophy
Destiny (ISS module)
Metaphysics
Relation (database)
Western philosophy
Aesthetics
Epistemology
Political science
Law
Far East


The Italian Empire and the Great War by Vanda Wilcox

Empire
Ancient history
Colonialism
History
CONQUEST
Spanish Civil War
Power (physics)
Great power
Economic history
China
Archaeology


Apollo
Art
Politics
White (mutation)
Chivalry
Art history
Mural
Manifest destiny
History
Literature
Law
Political science


The Wrath to Come: Gone with the Wind and the Lies America Tells by Sarah Churchwell (review)

Mythology
Hollywood
Spanish Civil War
Narrative
History
White (mutation)
Law
Literature
Art history
Art
Political science
Classics


Irish
Nationalism
Liberalism
History
Irish nationalism
State (computer science)
Literature
Sociology
Aesthetics
Art
Politics
Law
Political science
Philosophy
Linguistics


Taking Leave, Taking Liberties: American Troops on the Word War II Home Front by Aaron Hiltner (review)

Home front
Front (military)
Civil liberties
Word (group theory)
Law
History
Political science
Psychology
Sociology
World War II
Linguistics
Philosophy
Geography


Dissent
Authoritarianism
Political dissent
Democracy
Politics
State (computer science)
Political science
Political economy
Law
Nationalism
Sociology


Chinese Millets: native soil, the party–state, and art in contemporary China

China
Nationalism
State (computer science)
Communism
Peasant
Aesthetics
Art
Foregrounding
History
Literature
Political science
Law
Archaeology
Politics


German Blood, Slavic Soil: How Nazi Königsberg Became Soviet Kaliningrad by Nicole Eaton (review)

Slavic languages
German
Nazism
Ancient history
Classics
History
Archaeology


History
Politics
Skepticism
Flourishing
Globe
Protestantism
Great Depression
New Right
Law
Political science
Philosophy
Theology
Psychology


Becoming Utopian: The Culture and Politics of Radical Transformation by Tom Moylan

Political radicalism
Dystopia
Politics
Democracy
Mainstream
Authoritarianism
Utopia
Left-wing politics
Sociology
Nationalism
Aesthetics
Law
Political science
Philosophy


Mosaic Fictions: Writing Identity in the Spanish Civil War by Emily Robins Sharpe

Spanish Civil War
Politics
Mosaic
Identity (music)
Sociology
Subject (documents)
Nationality
Law
History
Political science
Immigration
Aesthetics
Philosophy


A Roundtable Discussion Pier Paolo Pasolini: Poetry, Politics, and Provocation

Lauren Aimee Curtis
Bruce Isaacs
Jane Mills
Susanna Scarparo
James Vaughan

Framework The Journal of Cinema and Media

Film director
Politics
Poetry
Queer
Art history
Art
Literature
Sociology
History
Religious studies
Philosophy
Law
Gender studies
Movie theater
Political science


Serbian Sonnet Rhyme Poetry Musical Art Literature History Linguistics Philosophy


Songs in Dark Times: Yiddish Poetry of Struggle from Scottsboro to Palestine by Amelia M. Glaser

AJS Review The Journal of the Association for Jewish Studies

Poetry
Communism
Judaism
Ideology
Literature
Lyricism
Politics
History
Art
Art history
Philosophy
Theology
Law
Political science


Shadows in the City of Light: Paris in Postwar French Jewish Writing ed. by Sara R. Horowitz, Amira Bojadzija-Dan and Julia Creet (review)

Judaism
Emancipation
Art history
Context (archaeology)
Art
History
Performance art
Archaeology
Politics
Law


Italian Chimeras: Narrating Italy through the Writing of Sebastiano Vassalli by Meriel Tulante

Historiography
Art history
Art
Subtitle
Context (archaeology)
Performance art
Subject (documents)
Italian studies
Literature
Interpretation (philosophy)
Humanities
Classics
History
Philosophy
Linguistics
Archaeology


Reflections on women’s activism in twentieth-century Britain

Political science
History
Political activism
Gender studies
Sociology
Law
Politics


Národní Muzeum (National Museum, Prague)

MY CZECH MATE"But where are the chickens?In my country, small villages like these have lots of chickens roaming around the hedgerows and lanes.Sometimes, it's becoming quite dangerous to drive without knocking them down.I suppose that here you lock them up, out of the way of the increasing amount of traffic.It's a sign of changing society, what some call progress.It must reduce their freedom and their enjoyment of life."He felt strongly, with emotion.I was driving along minor roads of the English countryside in the Spring of 1968, taking Zlatko to my research locality of what turned out to be Miocene strata of the Brassington Formation in Derbyshire.It was Zlatko's first visit to the West, on a scientific exchange scholarship that we shared, and which would take me on my first trip to Czechoslovakia later that summer.Earlier in the year Zlatko had spent a few months in India, at the Birbal Sahni Research Institute at Lucknow.There were plenty of chickens in the streets as well as plenty of experience of life under an occupying power.We had grown up taking many of these habits for granted and in these visits to new places they were being challenged for the first time.For Zlatko, the differences were pretty extreme, switching in a few years from the Nazis to the Soviets, from a political party of fascism to another of communism.In both systems you soon learn to look out for party members roaming in the streets, peering around the corners of the houses.The peculiar thing about Zlatko and myself was that despite being brought-up in different systems (he with these two extremes and in the same occupied country, me with just one system of liberal democracy) we still shared the same beliefs in middle-of-the-road life-styles.As I got to know Zlatko it became clear that he and other Czech scientists were being deprived of harnessing their great intellectual potential.They received very little investment and even less appreciation by their managers, the government and its society.His office was in a romantic old building in Spálená, surprisingly made up of inner glass walls with metal frame partitions.It did a lot for beauty but little for the work.Zlatko was well-known in Praha for the prim little blue Škoda that he drove circuitously and mysteriously around the back-streets of the Old and New Town.Everywhere he went, from Institute to Museum, from one laboratory to another office, from a bar to a restaurant, his Škoda seemed to follow.He specially loved driving into the countryside of Bohemia, from one brown-coal mine to another, staying at old hotels or boarding-houses, exchanging good wishes with the many locals as though they were close friends.He had a confident manner mixed with a boyish enthusiasm for whatever the business needed.There were jokes, stories, and time for listening and understanding.He got results quickly, fairly, sensibly, whether he was looking for specimens, understanding scientific articles, booking a hotel room, buying a beer.Clearly, he enjoyed the science involved in these activities, especially seeking out the features of extinct plants and linking them to the living equivalents.This involved finding common features and reconstructing patterns in plant structure and in the relationships between species.It was intricate detective work.The finger-prints used by forensic scientists were equivalent to the epidermal and stomatal cell outlines that Zlatko found in the leaf cuticle.Sherlock Holmes' magnifying glass was swapped by the light microscopes and scanning electron microscopes that Kvaček used so skilfully.In the fossils he found detail in the outlines and the shapes of leaves and other organs such as seeds, wood and flowers.He brought together evidence from these and other specialists.But something was missing.Isolated in the inward culture of the 1950s and '60s, the Czech palaeontologists were not encouraged to look outside from their own expertise.They were not encouraged to travel or contact other scientists and they were not using the new technology that others were finding so useful.They were stuck back in the tradition of central Europe's prize palaeobotanists Ettingshausen, Kräusel, Gothan and Weyland.They had not heard of the 1950s argument between the new DNA geneticists and the classical taxonomists.That was most loudly enacted between Jim Watson (he of Watson & Crick DNA fame) and E. O. Wilson (the Nobel prize winning ant specialist) at a lecture in the United States, when Watson publicly called Wilson a "stamp collector" and one of Watson's supporters poured a bucket of cold water over Wilson's head.It was time for different specialists to talk and share evidence with one another.


Transatlantic Modern Consumerisms: Italian Goods and Commercial Cultures in Postwar America, 1949–1972

Economic history
Political science
Commerce
Business
History


Elaine Black Yoneda: Jewish Immigration, Labor Activism, and Japanese American Exclusion and Incarceration

Immigration
Biography
Judaism
Communism
Gender studies
Racism
Scholarship
Political science
Sociology
History
Law
Politics


“If That Be Treason, Let Them Make the Most of It!”: Olin Downes, the Spanish Civil War, and Civil Liberties in the United States

Spanish Civil War
Civil disobedience
Law
Civil liberties
Refugee
Dictator
Government (linguistics)
History
Sociology
Political science
Philosophy
Politics


New voices in Israel settler colonial studies

Colonialism
Politics
Religious studies
Judaism
History
Scholarship
Power (physics)
Resistance (ecology)
Political science
Law
Philosophy
Archaeology


<i>Dictatorship and Daily Life in 20th Century Europe</i> by Lisa Pine

Latvian
Dictatorship
Communism
Nazi Germany
Nazism
History
State (computer science)
Economic history
Political science
Sociology
Law
German
Democracy
Archaeology
Philosophy


Journey to Indo-América: APRA and the Transnational Politics of Exile, Persecution, and Solidarity, 1918–1945

Solidarity
Politics
Power (physics)
Alliance
Sociology
Centrality
Persecution
Religious studies
Political science
Gender studies
Law
Philosophy


Big Feminism: The Fiftieth Anniversary Issue of <i>Signs</i>

Feminism
Scholarship
Sociology
Human sexuality
Gender studies
Honor
Agency (philosophy)
Power (physics)
Oppression
Social science
Law
Political science
Politics


Political radicalism
Politics
Institution
Political science
Order (exchange)
History
Media studies
Sociology
Law


Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-Building, the Fate of Minorities

Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University

Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America

East-Central Europe
Democracy
Peasant
Economic history
Interwar period
Political science
World War II
History
Ancient history
Law
Politics


Italy’s Sea: Empire and Nation in the Mediterranean, 1895–1945

Ancient history
Empire
Colonialism
Byzantine architecture
Politics
History
Navy
Geography
Turkish
Middle East
Classics
Archaeology
Political science
Law


Feminism
Scholarship
Sociology
Human sexuality
Gender studies
Honor
Agency (philosophy)
Power (physics)
Silence
Oppression
Social science
Law
Aesthetics
Politics
Political science
Philosophy


Modernity
Vitalism
Reflexivity
Context (archaeology)
Epistemology
Sociology
Aesthetics
Psychoanalysis
Philosophy
Art history
History
Psychology
Anthropology


Neorealism (international relations)
Realism
Movie theater
Phenomenon
Conversation
Hollywood
Art history
Literature
History
Philosophy
Art
Epistemology
International relations
Politics
Political science
Law


Italians from Brazil and the Armed Conflicts of the Twentieth Century: Money and Men for the Italian Wars

History
Political science
Economic history
Ancient history


Gender Space and Collaboration Politics: Christine Longford’s <i>The Furies</i> (1933)

National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland

Irish
Politics
Context (archaeology)
Queer
Gender studies
Sociology
Media studies
History
Political science
Law


nobody
Communism
Democracy
Law
Politics
Supreme court
Mistake
Order (exchange)
Political science
Happening
History
Sociology
Economic history
Art history
Economics


Labor Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas

Patriotism
Power (physics)
Politics
Government (linguistics)
Presidential system
Capital (architecture)
Law
Political science
Citizenship
Shot (pellet)
Sociology
Art
Visual arts
Philosophy


School of Geography and Environment University of Oxford  Oxford UK

School of Geography and Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers

A few months have passed since I wrote my initial commentary. The Russian spring offensive has failed and the papers are now reporting that a Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun, this time using donated NATO tanks. Social media is awash with footage of destroyed military equipment and flag planting, but the movement of the frontline is often measured in metres rather than kilometres. A decisive victory for either side does not seem imminent. It is against this backdrop of prolonged crisis that I take the opportunity to thank my three interlocutors, all of whom have helped me expand my understanding of the war and clarify my position. Let me begin by responding to Luiza Bialasiewicz (Bialasiewicz, 2023), who rightly highlights the explosion of crude geopolitical reasoning in and around the European Union's institutions since late February 2022. A geopolitical EU had of course been in the making. But current events do signal both an escalation of that trend and a return to the political landscape of the early 2000s. For however much Kyiv's European and North American supporters, be they political leaders or intellectuals, try to convince us otherwise, they have travelled at least some of the way on that perilous road built by neoconservatism a good 20 years ago and which was itself always a continuation of the Cold War by other means. Bialasiewicz is right to note that a Republican victory in the 2024 US presidential elections and swing to a paleoconservative foreign policy might intervene decisively into the war. But whether the European anti-Putin coalition is as fragile as she claims is yet to be seen. A look at the European far right, which one might expect to harness the forces of discontent, reveals the following: Poland's Law and Justice party (PiS) and Spain's Vox have both held assertive positions towards Putin's Russia, as has Italy's governing post-fascist Fratelli d'Italia. The British Tory Party, which has moved so far to the right that it has effectively annihilated the electoral chances of other hyper-nationalist parties, stands firmly behind the Ukrainian war effort. As the war has slowly but surely retreated from the headlines, any mobilisation of war wariness would depend on the electorate continuing to see the cost-of-living crisis as a consequence of NATO's war effort. But there seems to be no evidence, for instance, that Poland's drastic increase of defence spending to five per cent(!) of GDP has dampened the country's resolve vis-à-vis Russia (Karnitschnig & Kość, 2022). A split is now perhaps more likely to arise from an unsuccessful Ukrainian counter-offensive, which brings home the message that even NATO's advanced military technology does not allow for a decisive breakthrough. For the time being however, Putin's war seems to have reforged ‘the West’ both as an agent in world politics and as a category of civilisational identification. Vera Smirnova (Smirnova, 2023) offers much to complicate how we might think about Russian territorial politics by highlighting the most important tensions that run through territorial discourses and practices. The fact that Eurasianism itself has a decolonial history was new to me and introduces another fascinating twist in the story, even if Smirnova rightly diverts our attention away from this Western ‘darling’. But I remain as yet unconvinced that the ‘decolonisation of Russia’ can be modelled on the decolonisation of academic knowledges elsewhere. I am not arguing that Russians should not engage in the kind of debates that some settler colonial societies have begun to have. My point is rather that decolonisation in the West is largely a counter-hegemonic project. While some African dictatorships have promoted symbolic decolonisation as part of their ruling ideology (Masakure & Nkomo, 2023), the governments of former European empires continue to suppress their colonial histories. When the call to decolonise Russia is uttered in the West, where the crimes of Russian and Soviet imperialism are well understood and where the call is effectively backed up by HIMARS and Leopards, it has a rather more hegemonic ring to it. In short, I suspect that we are, as I think Smirnova accepts, dealing with a number of quite different political projects here. Finally then, a few words on Nick Megoran's (Megoran, 2023) contribution. I agree with him on the perils of ontologising Russian imperialism and believe he is right to query the chronology of events. But the question is not whether the world looks different from the vantage point of a consumer of Russian state TV (we already know it does). It is rather to what degree the Kremlin's storyline on NATO expansion is correct and to what extent the fact that some of it might be correct matters. I do not doubt that the Russian political elite have believed NATO (and EU) enlargement to constitute some kind of threat, though that in itself does not say all that much about what threat it really posed. One also has to read this question alongside that of whether Russia's elite were ever fully prepared to respect Ukrainian sovereignty, even before the rise of Putin (Nilsson, 2010). We might debate, moreover, how much importance we should attach to Russia's ‘pro-Western’ moment in the early 2000s and how much room to manoeuvre Ukraine really had left in the run-up to the 2022 invasion. Clearly, Washington and Kyiv could and should have renounced any ambition for a Ukrainian NATO membership – but it is unclear whether that would have prevented the invasion. It should be remembered that the Kremlin has provided a number of further reasons for its ‘special military operation’, including ‘denazification’ and the reclaiming of historic lands. So even by Russia's own standards, NATO enlargement is hardly the whole story. I also note that Megoran explicitly reproduces slogans from Stop the War Coalition, the UK's erstwhile leading anti-war campaigner. But much like Stop the War, Megoran seems keen to ignore what has happened since February 2022. The point of starting my commentary with fascism, genocide and urbicide (I do not cite Snyder ‘approvingly’ by the way) was to lay out the terrain on which a pacifist case, Christian or otherwise, must now be made, regardless of whether one agrees with each of these charges. Megoran sounds like he is on the defensive when he tells us that he abhors the invasion, but he does not really update his position. Yes, grassroots pacifism had an important role to play in the Cold War and again as a critique of various US-led invasions. Pacifists still make critical contributions to the debate on nuclear armament. But Stop the War had lost its way long before Russian tanks crossed the border in 2022. Having acquired a reputation for being soft on dictators, including Syria's Bashar al-Assad, its rallies now attract a fraction of the crowds they drew 20 years ago. Its position amounts to what some Russian socialists have referred to as ‘false pacifism’ (Russian Socialist Movement, 2023), a grasp for yesterday's moral certainties and an often-reflexive embrace of the West's enemies which confuses the desired outcome (peace) with the next move to achieve that outcome. I do hope that geographers can avoid such pre-formulated positions without succumbing to a mindless liberal militarism. They certainly do not need to be afraid of ambivalence. The authors have nothing to report. I have no conflict of interest. There is no data set associated with this article.

Victory
Geopolitics
Offensive
Politics
Political science
Law
Martial law
Ukrainian
Political economy
Economic history
Sociology
History
Economics


Review Essay: “It all begins with women”: Women's Resilience in Fascist Italy and War

G. d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara

Resilience (materials science)
History
Political science
Gender studies
Sociology


The Revue International Anarchiste's World Survey (1924–1925)

Dictatorship
Economic history
Nationalism
Authoritarianism
State (computer science)
Democracy
Political economy
Political science
History
Sociology
Politics
Law


Some lessons from the 1930s Ethiopian and Chinese national liberation wars

Marxist philosophy
Politics
World War II
Colonialism
Political science
Relation (database)
Class conflict
Sanctions
Spanish Civil War
Law
Political economy
Sociology
Economic history
History


Politics
Geopolitics
History
Publication
Media studies
Sociology
World literature
Literature
Classics
Political science
Law
Art


Negation
Spirituality
Psychology
Philosophy
Linguistics
Medicine
Alternative medicine


Historical Roots of Russian Anti-Westernism

of historical sciences, prof. Ukrainian Catholic University

DOI: 10.47632/2786-717X-2023-2-177-201 УДК 930.85:327(470+571:4) Як цитувати: Олександр Зайцев, Історичні корені російського антизахідництва, Ukrainian Historical Review / Український історичний огляд, IІ | 2023, 177–201. Олександр Зайцев Історичні корені російського антизахідництва Теоретичною рамкою статті є розуміння локальних цивілізацій як уявлених спільнот, а основою джерельної бази – тексти російських письменників і мислителів XIX ст., а також сучасних політиків та ідеологів. Автор простежує, як формувалося уявлення про Росію і Захід як різні культурно-історичні типи (цивілізації), й висуває тезу, що одна з основних причин російсько-української війни – це історично вкорінена в російському суспільстві ворожість до Заходу і, як похідна, ворожість до України. Негативне сприйняття Заходу має в Росії давні історичні корені. Після монгольського завоювання історичні долі північно-східної та південно-західної частин Русі розійшлися: перша надовго опинилася у сфері впливу Орди і в дедалі більшій ізоляції від решти Європи, тоді як друга не поривала зв’язків із західними сусідами і згодом сама стала частиною європейського соціокультурного простору. Дальша історія стосунків Московії/Росії з європейськими країнами сприяла формуванню двох протилежних комплексів ідей та уявлень: і західництва, згідно з яким Росія і Захід є частинами єдиного культурно-історичного простору, а отже Росія має розвиватися за моделлю Заходу, і антизахідництва, відповідно до якого Захід не лише цивілізаційно чужий Росії, а й становить для неї смертельну загрозу. Антизахідництво сформувалося як тенденція суспільної думки в першій половині XIX cт. і з того часу набирало різних форм, ставши складником різних російських ідеологічних напрямів: офіційної ідеології царизму, слов’янофільства, панславізму, народництва, анархізму, комунізму, особливо сталінізму, євразійства і нарешті сучасного путінізму та різноманітних течій радикального російського націоналізму. У всіх цих напрямах антизахідництво поєднувалося з різними формами російського месіанства. Присутність антизахідництва в різних, навіть позірно протилежних, ідеологічних та філософських течіях свідчить про його глибоку вкоріненість у російській культурі та цивілізації. Усвідомлення цього важливе не лише для оцінки перспектив розвитку Росії та її відносин із Заходом, а й для вибору оптимальної геополітичної стратегії України, адже російське антизахідництво, поєднане з імперіалізмом, є найбільшою перешкодою для реалізації її прозахідного цивілізаційного вибору. References Adadurov Vadim. 1812 god kak voyna tsivilizatsiy: vvedenie v sotsiokulturnuyu istoriyu russkogo pokhoda Napoleona // Epokha 1812 goda. Issledovania. Istochniki. Istoriografia, vyp. 12. Moskva 2014, s. 212–234 [Ададуров Вадим. 1812 год как война цивилизаций: введение в социокультурную историю русского похода Наполеона // Эпоха 1812 года. Исследования. Источники. Историография, вып. 12. Москва 2014, c. 212–234]. [In Russian.] Adadurov Vadim. Voyna tsivilizatsiy: Sotsiokul’turnaya istoriya russkogo pokhoda Napoleona, t. 1: Religiya – yazyk. Kiev 2017 [Ададуров Вадим. Война цивилизаций: Социокультурная история русского похода Наполеона, т. 1: Религия – язык. Киев 2017]. [In Russian.] Anderson Benedikt. Uiavleni spilnoty: mirkuvannia shchodo pokhodzhennia i poshyrennia natsionalizmu / per. z anhl. Viktor Morozov, 2-he vyd. Kyiv 2001 [Андерсон Бенедикт. Уявлені спільноти: міркування щодо походження й поширення націоналізму / пер. з англ. Віктор Морозов, 2-ге вид. Київ 2001]. [In Ukrainian.] Bakunin Mikhail. Narodnoe delo: Romanov, Pugachev ili Pestel’ // Izbranniye sochineniya, t. 3. Moskva 2014, s. 77–97 [Бакунин Михаил. Народное дело: Романов, Пугачев или Пестель // Избранные сочинения, т. 3. Москва 2014, с. 77–97]. [In Russian.] Berdiayev Nikolay. Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma. Reprintnoye vosproizvedeniye izdaniya YMCA-PRESS, 1955 g. Moskva 1990 [Бердяев Николай. Истоки и смысл русского коммунизма. Репринтное воспроизведение издания YMCA-PRESS, 1955 г. Москва 1990]. [In Russian.] Blokhin Konstantin. Rossiya i Zapad. Voyenno-politicheskiy konflikt 2022 goda: Meniaya pravila igry // Svobodnaya mysl’ 2 (2022) 25–34 [Блохин Константин. Россия и Запад. Военно-политический конфликт 2022 года: Меняя правила игры // Свободная мысль 2 (2022) 25–34]. [In Russian.] Chernyshevskiy Nikolay. Apologiya sumasshedshego // Sochineniya: v 2 t. Moskva 1987, t. 2, s. 278–307 [Чернышевский Николай. Апология сумасшедшего // Сочинения: в 2 т. Москва 1987, т. 2, с. 278–307]. [In Russian.] Danieliuk Robert. Yednist viry pry bahatomanitnosti obriadiv: Yezuit Ivan Haharin i yoho proiekty stvorennia skhidnoho vidhaluzhennia v Tovarystvi Isusa //Naukovi zapysky UKU, ch. VII, seriia Istoriia, vyp. 2. Lviv 2015, s. 145–158 [Данєлюк Роберт. Єдність віри при багатоманітності обрядів: Єзуїт Іван Гагарін і його проєкти створення східного відгалуження в Товаристві Ісуса // Наукові записки УКУ, ч. VII, серія Історія, вип. 2. Львів 2015, с. 145–158]. [In Ukrainian.] Danilevskiy Igor. Russkiye zemli glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (XII–XIV vv.): Kurs lektsiy. Moskva 2001 [Данилевский Игорь. Русские земли глазами современников и потомков (XII–XIV вв.): Курс лекций. Москва 2001]. [In Russian.] [Danylevskyi Ihor.] Rus’ pid vladoiu Ordy // Narysy istorii Rosii / zah. red. Oleksandr Chubarian. Kyiv 2007, s. 149–230 [[Данилевський Ігор.] Русь під владою Орди // Нариси історії Росії / заг. ред. Олександр Чубар’ян. Київ 2007, с. 149–230]. [In Ukrainian.] Danilevskiy Igor. Sovremenniye rossiyskiye diskussii o kniaze Aleksandre Nevskom // Trudy po rossievedeniiu 2 (2010) 225–236 [Данилевский Игорь. Современные российские дискуссии о князе Александре Невском // Труды по россиеведению 2 (2010) 225–236]. [In Russian.] Danilevskiy Nikolai. Rossiya i Evropa: Vzgliad na kulturnye i politicheskiye otnosheniya slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu. Moskva 2003 [Данилевский Николай. Россия и Европа: Взгляд на культурные и политические отношения славянского мира к германо-романскому. Москва 2003]. [In Russian.] Dontsov Dmytro. Dukh Rosii. Kyiv 2011 [Донцов Дмитро. Дух Росії. Київ 2011]. [In Ukrainian.] Dontsov Dmytro. Moskovska otruta. Toronto – Montreal 1955 [Донцов Дмитро. Московська отрута. Торонто – Монтреаль 1955]. [In Ukrainian.] Dontsov Dmytro. Pidstavy nashoi polityky. Viden’ 1921 [Д. Донцов. Підстави нашої політики. Відень 1921]. [In Ukrainian.] Dugin Aleksandr. Evraziyskiy revansh Rossiyi. Moskva 2014 [Дугин Александр. 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Lokalno-tsivilizatsionniye issledovaniya i sotsialnyi konstruktivizm: vozmozhnosti sopriazheniya // Filosofskaya mysl’ 11 (2021) 105–118 [Ильинская Светлана. Локально-цивилизационные исследования и социальный конструктивизм: возможности сопряжения // Философская мысль 11 (2021) 105–118]. [In Russian.] Kharari Yuval Noi. Liudyna rozumna: Istoriia liudstva vid mynuloho do maibutnoho / per. z anhl. Yaroslava Lebedenka, 3-tie vyd. Kharkiv 2019 [Харарі Ювал Ной. Людина розумна: Історія людства від минулого до майбутнього / пер. з англ. Ярослав Лебеденко, 3-тє вид. Харків 2019]. [In Ukrainian.] Kiselev Sergey, Maslin Mikhail. N. Ya. Danilevskiy o budushchem rossiyskoi tsivilizatsiyi // N. Ia. Danilevskiy. Rossiya i Evropa: Vzgliad na kulturniye i politicheskiie otnosheniia slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu. Moskva 2003,7–25 [Киселев Сергей, Маслин Михаил. Н. Я. Данилевский о будущем российской цивилизации // Н. Я. Данилевский. Россия и Европа: Взгляд на культурные и политические отношения славянского мира к германороманскому. Москва 2003, с. 7–25]. [In Russian.] Kutsyi Ivan. Geneza katehorii «tsyvilizatsiia»: mizh realnoiu ta uiavliuvanoiu spilnotoiu // Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karazina. Seriia: Istoriia Ukrainy. Ukrainoznavstvo: istorychni ta filosofski nauky 19 (2014) 82–92 [Куций Іван. Ґенеза категорії «цивілізація»: між реальною та уявлюваною спільнотою // Вісник Харківського національного університету імені В. Н. Каразіна. Серія: Історія України. Українознавство: історичні та філософські науки 19 (2014) 82–92]. [In Ukrainian.] Laruelle Marlene. Accusing Russia of Fascism: Polemics around Russia’s Belonging to Europe // Russia in Global Affairs 18 (4) (2020) 100–123. Leontiev Konstantin. O panslavizme: Sbornik rabot. Moskva 1994 [Леонтьев Константин. О панславизме: Сборник работ. Москва 1994]. [In Russian.] Letniakov Denis. Tsivilizatsiyi kak “voobrazhaemiye soobshchestva”. K konstruktivistskoy kritike tsivilizatsionnoy teorii // Lichnost’. Kultura. Obshchestvo 23 (3) (2021) 57–69 [Летняков Денис. Цивилизации как «воображаемые сообщества». К конструктивистской критике цивилизационной теории //Личность. Культура. Общество 23 (3) (2021) 57–69]. [In Russian.] Malchenkov Stanislav. Tsivilizatsionnyi diskurs v vyskazyvaniyakh V. V. Putina //Diskurs-Pi 19 (2) (2022) 53–71 [Мальченков Станислав. Цивилизационный дискурс в высказываниях В. В. Путина // Дискурс-Пи 19 (2) (2022) 53–71]. [In Russian.] Martin Aleksandr. Romantiki, reformatory, reaktsionery: Russkaya konservativnaya mysl’ i politika v tsarstvovaniye Aleksandra I / per. s angl. Lev Vysotskiy. Sankt-Peterburg 2021 [Мартин Александр. Романтики, реформаторы, реакционеры: Русская консервативная мысль и политика в царствование Александра I / пер. с англ. Лев Высоцкий. Санкт-Петербург 2021]. [In Russian.] Motyl Alexander J. 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Геополітична роль України // Вісник Національного юридичного університету імені Ярослава Мудрого. Серія: філософія, філософія права, політологія, соціологія 1 (2022) 169–177]. [In Ukrainian.] Pushkin Aleksandr. Polnoe sobraniye sochineniy: v 16 t., t. 14: Perepiska, 1828– 1831. Moskva – Leningrad 1941 [Пушкин Александр. Полное собрание сочинений: в 16 т., т. 14: Переписка, 1828–1831. Москва – Ленинград 1941]. [In Russian.] Siljak Ana. Nikolay Berdiaev and the Origin of Russian Messianism // The Journal of Modern History 88 (4) (2016) 737–763. Sinitskaya Nina. Tretiy Rim: istoki i evoliutsiya russkoy srednevekovoy kontseptsiyi (XV–XVI vv.). Moskva 1998 [Синицкая Нина. Третий Рим: истоки и эволюция русской средневековой концепции (XV–XVI вв.). Москва 1998]. [In Russian.] Smolii Valerii, Yas’ Oleksii. Suchasna rosiisko-ukrainska viina u svitli postkolonializmu // Visnyk Natsionalnoi akademii nauk Ukrainy 6 (2022) 3–16 [Cмолій Валерій, Ясь Олексій. 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Viktor Shovkun; t. 2 / per. z anhl. Volodymyr Mytrofanov, Petro Tarashchuk. Kyiv 1995 [Тойнбі Арнольд Дж. Дослідження історії, т. 1 / пер. з англ. Віктор Шовкун; т. 2 / пер. з англ. Володимир Митрофанов, Петро Таращук. Київ 1995]. [In Ukrainian.] Tsimbaev Nikolay. Slavianofil’stvo. Moskva 1986 [Цимбаев Николай. Славянофильство. Москва 1986]. [In Russian.] Tsitkilov Petr. Tsivilizatsionnoye stolknoveniye Rossiyi i Zapada na Ukraine // Svobodnaya mysl’ 6 (2022) 119–132 [Циткилов Петр. Цивилизационное столкновение России и Запада на Украине // Свободная мысль 6 (2022) 119–132]. [In Russian.] Vernadskiy Georgiy. Dva podviga sv. Aleksandra Nevskogo // Evraziyskiy vremennik, kn. IV. Praga 1925, s. 318–337. [Вернадский Георгий . Два подвига св. Александра Невского // Евразийский временник, кн. IV. Прага 1925, с. 318–337]. [In Russian.] Walicki Andrzej. W kręgu konserwatywnej utopii: Struktura i przemiany rosyjskiego słowianofilstwa. Warszawa 1964. [In Polish.] Yakunin Vladimir. Tsivilizatsionniye osnovaniya sovremennogo mirovogo politicheskogo krizisa // Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo universiteta. Seriya: Istoriya i politicheskiye nauki 3 (2022) 7–20 [Якунин Владимир. Цивилизационные основания современного мирового политического кризиса // Вестник Московского государственного областного университета. Серия: История и политические науки 3 (2022) 7–20]. [In Russian.]


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The Architecture of Immigration Restriction, 1924

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Darkness on the Edge: Revisionary Black Radicalism in the Depression Era

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Contrasting Depictions in 1920s Italian and British Colonial Missionary Documentaries

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Post‐War Sociology of Religion 1945–2024 in Britain and America

After the great heyday of the early sociology of religion—Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Troeltsch—the sociological study of religion went into decline. One might argue that it was revived in the 1960s, but ironically, it had a second life to study secularization. The two major figures who did not share the same view of secular society in British sociology were Bryan Wilson (1926–2004), who published Religion in Secular Society in 1966, and David Martin (1929–2019), who spent much of his academic career attacking the secularization thesis publishing an early collection of articles on secularization in The Religious and the Secular (Martin, 1969) and The Future of Christianity (Martin, 2011) shortly before his death in 2019. For example, the legacy of Martin is found in the work of Grace Davie (1994, 1997) with the idea of "believing without belonging" and in Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas in their research on spirituality replacing institutionalized religion (Woodhead with Heelas and Martin 2001). Their view of the vitality of spirituality in a secular society depends on whether religion, in any form, can survive the process of deinstitutionalization. James A. Beckford (1942–2022) was another important figure at this stage of the sociology of religion in post-war Britain. He held various positions at British universities such as Reading, Durham, and Warwick. In 1975, he founded the study group for the sociology of religion for the British Sociological Association, but he also developed a strong connection with French sociology. His first major publication was The Trumpet of Prophecy. A Sociological Analysis of Jehovah's Witnesses (Beckford, 1975). The status of the Witnesses as a religion and their place in British society was still controversial, and Beckford's publication was important in correcting many public misunderstandings about the Witnesses as a religion. Beckford was also instrumental in bringing to attention the growing importance of Islam in British life. He drew attention to the neglect of Muslims and their issues in British society, including the role of prison detention for the Muslim community (Beckford et al., 2005). Beckford was, in some respects, a reflection of the traditions of both Martin and Wilson. Returning to Martin's sociology of religion, one feature of his approach that has received less attention was the relationship he identified between religion and two revolutions, namely in America and France. Martin gave secularization theory a new and interesting direction in his analysis of the long-term impact of two revolutions in 1783 and 1789 on religious institutions. The American Revolution of 1783 separated the church and state, whereas the French Revolution of 1789 subordinated the church to the state. My general position on theories of secularization is that we must consider more than the attitudes and practices of individuals. It must also look at the structure of and struggles with power in society. For that reason, Martin's approach to the consequences of revolution was welcome. The political strategies of these societies to solve the problem of power with respect to church and state have indeed been profound and long-lasting. However, the political results have been extremely varied. In the United States, the constitutional settlement of the revolution, starting in colonial Virginia, built a wall between the church and the state to secure individual religious freedom. However, in the past decades, evangelical Christianity and Catholicism have had decisive effects on the political agenda of the state with respect, for example, to sexual identity, marriage, and reproductive rights. However, there are now six conservative Catholic members of the Supreme Court. The religious composition of the Supreme Court has raised criticism regarding the independence of their decisions, especially after the overthrow of Roe v Wade following Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health. The French Revolution provides a dramatic example of a state enforcing secularity in the public domain by making legal decisions, for example, about what is acceptable as a "religion" rather than a "cult." The French policy toward religion has in the past been described as a "War on Sects" (Palmer, 2011). Laicite has become the fundamental lens through which religious institutions are administered and bureaucratically controlled. The ideal of a civil religion as a foundation of public life has created a permanent tension regarding public display of religiosity, for example, the right to wear a burqa in public has been a divisive issue (Gunn, 2004). Despite their different revolutionary origins, the role of the Shari'a in both societies has been contentious, where the Shari'a is misconstrued as "state law" and "arbitration tribunals" have been misidentified as "courts" (Possamai, Richardson, and Turner, 2015). Martin did not include the British Isles in his studies of the long-term effects of political revolutions on culture and religion, but the British example is, in fact, important for his argument. Political revolutions in Britain in 1649, when Oliver Cromwell created a Commonwealth and executed Charles 1, and again in 1688–1689, when the monarchy was restored under the rule of William of Orange, but under the oversight of Parliament, have supported the dominance of Protestantism over culture and constitution. George 1 was the first Hanoverian King in 1714. The two revolutions have guaranteed the long-term role of the Anglican Church as the conduit of conservative values and sentiments (Scruton, 2012). These political events and their national consequences have not seriously interested sociologists of religion despite the British monarch being the head of the Church of England. The rituals surrounding the death of Queen Elizabeth and the coronation of Charles III celebrated the peculiar survival of royalty in a modern democracy. The significance of the continuing monarchy was best captured by the political theorist Tom Nairn in his The Enchanted Glass (1989), whose main argument was that Britain had become an industrial society without ever becoming a modern one. Its secularization was limited by the widespread "fetishism of the crown." Jose Casanova (1994) in Public Religions in the Modern World offered yet another version of the focus on religion and revolution in his publications on public religions and social change. Apart from the moral majority in the United States, his examples came from Catholic societies undergoing political change, namely Spain, Poland, and Brazil. Casanova claimed that these developments constituted a "deprivatization" of religion. The American example has primarily involved Protestant churches. The contemporary Protestant support for Donald Trump's version of populism continues to support Casanova's argument. However, the other examples can be regarded as post-Vatican II developments and in response to the Catholic Church's involvement in movements for autonomy and democratic governance in Poland, Spain, and Latin America. There have, in fact, been no further examples. In addition, the national and international role of the church in public life has been compromised by revelations of sexual abuse by the priesthood from the 1980s onward. Various commissions have been undertaken, such as the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse in Ireland. It was after 2018 that the Pope began to take overt action to address the problems while recognizing at the same time the depth of the crisis, for example, in Chile. The other challenge to the Christian churches concerns same-sex marriage. Can the churches suddenly change the traditional meaning and rituals around marriage? The larger crisis centers on the future development of marriage itself. How far can a liberal understanding of marriage evolve? If same-sex marriage is acceptable, why not polygamy? (Macedo, 2015). For many observers, the basic question of homosexuality has produced a crisis in the Anglican Church (Sachs, 2009). One neglected figure in these debates about secularization is the Italian philosopher Augusto Del Noce (1910–1989), who understood what he called the "sexualization" of modern culture as a fundamental aspect of modernization in two major publications: The Crisis of Modernity (Del Noce, 2015) and The Age of Secularization (Del Noce, 2017). The dominant ideology of the technological society is "scientism" or the view that the only valid knowledge is drawn from science. One consequence of scientism has been the replacement of the "good life" with "well-being" which requires the removal of all forms of "repression." Scientism provides the philosophical foundations for the sexual revolution in which all forms of "bigotry" and "repression" must be eliminated with the intervention of the new science of psychology (Del Noce, 2015:157–186). In this process of liberation, sex is disconnected from procreation and family life. Sex becomes an end in itself and is liberated by the widespread availability of contraception. Any criticism of these developments is rejected as repressive. Such repressed individuals need sexual counseling by scientific psychology. One consequence of these developments is the decline in the fertility rate. The total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of children born to a woman if she successfully completes her fertility around 49 years of age. A TFR of 2.1 is required to replace a population. In 1900, the Italian TFR was 4.6, but in 2020, this rate fell to 1.33 or well below replacement. This contemporary demographic change provides a dramatic confirmation of Del Noce's pessimism about the sexual revolution. Without immigration to replace its labor force, Italian society would face economic stagnation and widespread political instability. Del Noce, who had lived through the time of Italian fascism, argued that the age of scientism would usher in a new totalitarianism. Del Noce's views were often rejected as reactionary, but he replied that the new totalitarianism is a form of disintegration before becoming a form of domination. While rejecting the past, it cannot create any new values and would become ironically conservative in protecting the economic and political interests of a dominant class. What is required is not the preservation of the authority of the church but the defense of the religious dimension of human existence. The refutation of totalitarianism requires a recognition of the transcendent in human life. The originality of Del Noce's approach to modernization as secularization was to connect it to a sexual revolution as an aspect of a new totalitarianism. Whereas the contemporary debate about secularization has, in many respects, become stale, Del Noce took it into a new dimension by connecting it to sexual liberation as indicative of repressive politics. In the United States, Peter Berger (1929–2017) was originally a champion of the idea of secularization in his theoretical framework that explored the fragility of 'plausibility structures' in the modern world with Thomas Luckmann (1967). His early theoretical work had engaged with the German philosopher Arnold Gehlen, whose philosophical anthropology had inspired Berger's view of the precarious nature of social institutions, including religious structures (Turner, 2018). Berger wrote the Foreword to Gehlen's Man in an Age of Technology (1980). Gehlen's philosophical anthropology pictured humans as instinctively weak and that their survival depended not on instincts but on building institutions. Gehlen also saw modern society as in a state of post-histoire. Berger and Luckman's (1967) sociology of knowledge was completely built on these foundations. Eventually, Berger came dramatically to recant the idea of secularization as a universal component of the process of modernization in his Desecularization (Berger, 1999), especially after he became aware of the vibrancy of religion outside the West. This publication did much to bury existing theories of secularization, and indeed, criticism of the secularization thesis became "the new master narrative itself" (Pollack, 2014:111–122). I have, however, supported Steve Bruce's argument that the recantation was unnecessary and that Berger's work on plausibility structures remained valid (Bruce, 2011, 2018). In any case, there is little disagreement that the churches are in decline and that we are moving into a period of postinstitutional religion. Churches are compelled to adopt contemporary means of self-promotion, such as advertising themselves online, if they are going to retain their congregations. Spirituality and believing without belonging may offer valid insights into these new forms of religiosity, but they may also be seen to be perfectly compatible with a private culture of modern individualism. American sociologists have challenged this view. Stark and Bainbridge (1985), in their economic model of religion, argue that the vibrancy and dynamism of American religiosity depend precisely on the absence of a dominated established church and the openness of the religious market. One might argue that these research themes—secularization, the decline of institutionalized religion, and the erosion of the plausibility structures supporting religious faith—were the legacy of the heyday of the early sociology of religion. Durkheim had spoken of the decline of the "old gods." However, he concluded that religion "seems destined to transform itself rather than to disappear" (Durkheim, 2001:326) and "No society can exist which does not feel the need at regular intervals to satisfy and reaffirm the collective feeling and ideas that constitute its unity and its personality" (Durkheim, 2001:322). In the 1960s, much of the focus of American sociology was not on sociological developments in Europe and still less on the rest of the world. Durkheim's use of Australian aboriginal resources that had been collected by British colonial administrators was unique. The other major figure in the American sociological tradition in this period was Robert N. Bellah, who played a key role in this article, especially when I looked at the comparative historical sociology of religious traditions in the so-called "Axial Age." Bellah is central to my own approach to sociology, given my long-standing interest in Max Weber's legacy of historical and comparative sociology, as perhaps best illustrated in Weber and Islam (Turner, 1974). Bellah's sociology has, in fact, always been comparative and open to diverse cultural traditions. For example, his early research involved a study of the Apache kinship system (Bellah, 1952). Ironically, however, his most influential publication, at least in his early career, was his article on the civil religion in Daedalus (Bellah, 1967) that involved the debate about religion in the public domain in the form of "the civil religion" in America. Given Bellah's' lifelong interest in "tribal cultures" and "nonwestern societies," the success of the 1967 article was something of an albatross around his neck. The article "took on a life of its own, one that distracted attention from the substantive issues for which it was originally intended" (Bellah and Tipton, 2006:221). However, aspects of the debate continued to appear in his later work, such as Habits of the Heart (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, 1985). I dwell on Bellah because his work is, in many respects, the centerpiece of this article. His later engagement with the key idea of 'transcendence' is, to my mind, a key turning point, not only in the sociology of religion but in historical sociology. Two publications coming towards the end of his life, namely Religion in Human Evolution (Bellah, 2011) and The Axial Age and its Consequences (Bellah and Joas, 2012) may have been his major—indeed magisterial—life achievements. Although much of this interest was developed towards the end of his life, his engagement with religiocultural evolution developed from his time at Harvard in seminars with Parsons and Eisenstadt in 1955. The idea of evolutionary stages was presented in Beyond Belief (Bellah, 1970). Apart from Bellah's developing interest in Japan (Bellah, 2003), the sociology of religion of the 1960s was perhaps unsurprisingly local and national. Because sociology was late to develop in Britain, much of my undergraduate sociology involved studying American sociology. Thinking back to my undergraduate sociology program at the University of Leeds in the 1960s, our set reading included Will Herberg's Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology in 1960 (Gleason, 2005). My reading in social theory included the daunting Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 1949). When I eventually came to prepare for my dissertation on the decline of Methodism in England—of which Martin was the external examiner—I was reading Martin's A Sociology of English Religion (Martin, 1967) and Bryan Wilson's (1959) "An Analysis of Sect Development" in the American Sociological Review. In retrospect, the main interest of my thesis was the division that emerged in Methodism between the local chapels and the senior ministers in the Methodist Circuit over ecumenicalism, which involved combining with the Church of England. To that I to and the to between the and study that had little to with the sociology of The thesis was in as The of An analysis of religious and In much of the attention of sociology in the period Berger's recantation in involved a national focus on religion and its decline or starting in the 1960s, played a key role in the sociology of religion. He wrote articles on the importance of Christianity in modern America his academic He also did much to sociology of religion on the academic agenda in the United States, starting with his of Max Weber's The Protestant and the of in and in The Structure of Social Action in he the work of sociologists who have remained on the sociological was eventually by the widespread of His in Europe was also by the of (1959) and on However, was on the sociology of religion and sociological theory at Leeds my undergraduate time at the Parsons in British sociology the of and He also the study of religion but eventually on his publishing Social and in It was a of the neglect of religion and culture in Although his work became influential in various including a of early Although Berger's argument may have the on religious vitality outside the the dominant in the sociology of religion have had a more a national This attention to was perhaps by the of Max Weber's The Protestant and the of My early reading of Weber was on the Protestant from included a of English Although of Weber in was it was challenged by and by later that many of his of including which Parsons as rather than The other was that Parsons Weber into his own of and 1975). the Protestant and the of inspired a of Despite this attention to German sociology, the of these developments in secularization theory was the absence of any great of the debate about secularization in German and sociology in the period to the World and the end of the World Max Martin and I was to be to the to Max Weber and His article first in and was eventually into English in had been a under Martin and had much of argument was despite their and Weber what described as philosophical much of social theory and to to with is in I found this approach after studying the impact of Arnold Gehlen's anthropology on The of this article concerns the neglect of comparative sociology of religion and the dominant focus on the United and Weber was eventually for his Religion of and The Religion of when these in English Given the neglect of Weber's on My Weber and Islam was and was by who was by for his research on the the success of my publication the that there was little and the was of Weber's view that Islam was a religion. I that was to much of by Muslim rather than Muslim My publication was also by a group of and on Islam and development Their number included who became influential in the study of Islam more in the anthropology of religion. included who had been a of and was to become the dominant of Islam of his It also included who became a of British These to the of Islam by which our understanding of Islam as a system or the as he His approach was also to with its focus on the foundations of was for a time the of the on Social at the University of and through that collection of his of Islam included sociology, and politics. I to and the of the modern debate on the Axial Age in because I view the question of the historical of many of the world religions and that had their in the period as fundamental to what we as In this turning point, Bellah the legacy of and restored evolutionary theory to contemporary sociology. However, Bellah's concerns were with the of the Axial Age and to what it can address our of and I this of the sociology of religion over the years or more with The first is that the secularization debate is now in sociology, and it is to that the debate However, it is to that there be major or theoretical that transform the There no be for research on with and their individual religious or outside religion, but this research not any of our modern My second is that in the past churches depended to a on the of the family to support its Christian Churches came to depend on the family for especially if they did not have a strong or evangelical My own thesis on Methodism in the 1960s concluded that the future of Methodism depended no on the of new members but on the of its population. In modern we are a decline of the traditional including late marriage, no marriage, and marriage. These developments to the fertility rate of the developed world and future of These developments not only church institutions but also Christian which included the idea of the and the of The basic Christian with who in There is no question that major such as have become as much as family Bryan who was, of far more conservative than David had argued that Christianity had in the United at the of its turning to Steve Bruce's new of Religion in Secular in the process of the religious without the form, of religious the of Bellah's to the Axial Age many of the of his in sociology, and It was the who what was about the age by are in the age of The Axial Age established the idea that there is a different and world the world in which we with the idea of the Age new use the in Bellah's with was one such These developments in the late work of Bellah contemporary sociologists of religion to take these traditions more of took and studies It is to to his 1967) and to that Weber was engaged in debates about the social role of Christianity in the who was also involved in the was a of was a figure in his own published The of the which challenged many of the of He also published the which was later as What is He played a role in Weber's development of the and in Weber's understanding of The debate about the Axial Age produced a of important a of academic the idea of an Axial Age has also produced a of For example, the religious in the period were far to constitute a age An view is that human has been by many rather than by one There is also the problem of the absence of any attention to and the and in Bellah's little or about religious before the Axial Bellah that some form of religious such as rituals in or societies," but the of a of One might that while the idea of a age not be it has many debates that have and our understanding of religion and While the Axial Age debate concluded that this early period of human development created the age of criticism attention to about and my version of these religious developments is that they not but rather the precarious of human our and These which are in are the foundations of any religious understanding of human life. These are perhaps with own response to the of the age in which he lived and to on the Axial The idea of was a response to these which with despite secularization and the of science to our and the of our publishing by Australian Catholic as of the Australian Catholic University the of Australian University

Secularization
Sociology
Spirituality
Sociology of religion
Religious studies
Vitality
Secularism
Lived religion
Christianity
Social science
Theology
Philosophy
Islam


The representation of women in ZANU and ZAPU propaganda during the Zimbabwe War of Liberation

Visiting Academic, Centre for Imperial and Post Colonial Studies, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

Ideology
Politics
Nationalism
Representation (politics)
Militarization
Gender studies
Narrative
Political science
Sociology
Media studies
Law
Art


“Non-Recognition of the Law Does Not Invalidate It”: The Status of BLA and Provisional IRA Prisoners

Memorandum
Miller
Politics
Dissent
Resistance (ecology)
Religious studies
Law
Sociology
Art history
History
Political science
Philosophy